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How POVERTY LOST ITS MEANING
F. Allan Hanson
After decades ofdashed hopes and expenditures that have produced
no tangible benefits, the nation seems tacitly to have acknowledged
that we fought a War on Poverty and poverty won (see Sawhill 1988:
1085). Many see a brave title—the “Personal Responsibility and
Employment Opportunity Act of 1996”—as merely papering over a
wearied and frustrated withdrawal from the War on Poverty.
It has been possible to withdraw from the War on Poverty partly
because the poor exerciseveiylittle political clout. They are a minority,
many of them do not vote, and they do not otherwise participate in
political life. Thus, when Congress was revamping poverty policy, the
halls were empty of lobbyists arguing the case for the poor (Clymer
1996).
But, of course, the poor have always been relatively powerless.
More importantly, the non-poor seem to have become less engaged
in the issue of poverty, making it easier for politicians to dismantle
federal welfare programs without antagonizing the middle and upper
classes which constitute their power base. The deeper questions are
therefore social and cultural rather than specifically political: Have
the non-poor lost interest in poverty? If so, why?
My answer to the first question is yes, and, to the second, because
poverty today has lost much of its meaning.In the past poverty signified
something more than just economic destitution, and it was its larger
significance that attracted the non-poor to the issue and motivated
them to try to do something about it, Now the larger meanings have
for the most part disappeared, leaving poverty as a drab, purely eco-
nomic issue with little to excite the involvement of the non-poor. The
purpose of this essay is to examine how this transformation came
about, and to suggest a reason for it.
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The Histoiy of Poverty: An Overview
A brief sketch of poverty’s history will throw its present form into
sharper relief The fundamental question about poverty has always
been who or what causes it. Western thinking on this question has
oscillated between placing the responsibility for poverty squarely on
poor people and locating it in systemic conditions beyond the control
of individuals. The distinction is visible in recent debates about why
we lost the War on Poverty, with liberals adopting a systemic perspec-
tive and conservatives taking the individualist view. Their arguments
contrast intriguingly with the reasons these same constituencies
advance for why we lost the other, hotter war that we were fighting
in Vietnam at roughly the same time. Now it is the liberals who
espouse a Rambo-type philosophy that we lost the War on Poverty
because we didn’t fight hard enough and we lacked the will to win.
Poor people are in their unfortunate condition due to circumstances
beyond their control. Because the source of poverty lies in the socio-
economic system, the solution to it must also be at the societal level:
large-scale interventions to rectify systemic inequities. But with the
drastic cuts i.n social programs of the Reagan administration, those in
the front lines were stripped of necessary resources and not allowed
to press on to victory. The war on poverty was fought with popguns
and ultimately it gave way to neglect and indifference (Quadagno
1994: 178, 197).
Conservatives counter that the war was misconceived from the
beginning, born of misunderstanding of the situation and the nature
of the adversary. They insist that poverty is at bottom an individual
problem. Able-bodied poor should take responsibility for their own
lives and extricate themselves from poverty by getting and holding a
job. Large-scale interventions such as the government programs of
the War on Poverty only make the situation worse by fostering depen-
dence of poor people on handouts (Murray 1984: 218, Mead 1986:
65, Olasky 1992: 231).
Simple oscillation between systemic and individual causes is not
sufficient, however, to capture the larger history of poverty. Since the
Middle Ages each of the two basic points ofview has dominated twice,
but each moment had its unique characteristics. I will try to capture
both the similarities and differences in the four versions of poverty
with the following terminology: medieval piety, rugged individualism,
state welfare, and contemporary individualism.
Medieval Piety
In the early Middle Ages the condition of poverty, or being “poor”
(pauperes), was not necessarily defined in terms of economic destitu-
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tion at all. In England and northern France of the 9th and 10th
centuries the category pauperes referred to free commoners: people
who were neither nobles nor clergy. While they were certainly not
well off economically, their most distinctive feature was that they did
not bear arms. Thus, they stood in need of protection. This was the
duty of the king and men at arms in France, while in England the
king was bound to protect them against “knightly violence” (Mollat
1986: 95, 98—99, 296; Hyams 1980: 261—62).
Even as poverty became associated with economic hardship, it was
not viewed as a social pathology. To the contrary, the poor formed
an intrinsic part of an organic society, the three orders or estates of
which—warriors, clergy, poor agricultural and other workers—were
thought to reflect the order of heaven (Duby 1980: 3—4). Thus around
the year 1000 people had a “mental image of a society one and triune
like the divinity whohad created and would ultimately judge it” (p. 5).
Given the divine origin of the social order, the poor were not held
individually responsible for their condition. Prosperity and poverty
alike were attributed to the grace of God, and all should accept their
lot with humility. Nor were the poor stigmatized. If anything they
were thought to be morally superior to the rich, particularly if they
had voluntarily renounced secular wealth and power. Monks, nobles,
and wealthy persons would wash the feet of the poor and invite them
to dine. St. Louis, King of France in the 13th century, cut bread and
poured drink himself for the paupers whom he fed at his own table.
In a society that condemned this-worldly things, the poor represented
a religious ideal. Moreover, they were downright useful to the rich
andpowerful as an outlet to atone for their sins through the Christian
charity of alms-giving (Geremek 1994: 7, 17—20, 42; Waxman 1977:
73—77; Mollat 1986: 44).
Rugged Individualism
The transition to the next social construct of poverty was a lengthy
one, not fully completed until the 18th or even the 19th century.
Probably the process started when people began to attribute signifi-
cance to the close link between poverty and unemployment, which
began in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. This period experi-
enced numerous poor harvests, famine, plague, severe winters, and
bad times generally. Many peasants lost their land, and others were
unable to support their families on their small holdings. These individ-
uals formed a kind of rural proletariat that moved from place to place
in search of work (Mollat 1986: 158—60). The numbers involved were
large: in 1300 half the peasanthouseholds in England required outside
wages earned by the family head tosurvive, and some 35 to40 percent
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of the population of Europe could be classified as poor (pp. 168,
174—76). When no work was to be found the itinerant poor had few
options other than begging and crime. The prospect of hordes of
vagrants begging, robbing, and assaulting their way across the country-
side inclined people, for the first time, to think of poverty as a social
pathology. By the second half of the 14th century the image of the
pious, meek pauper was undergoing a dark transformation. As Mollat
(p. 251) describes it,
More than ever there was a sharp contrast between the idealization
of spiritual poverty and the visibly sordid realities of material
poverty.... What did hideous tramps and fierce bandits have in
common with Christ? How could people tolerate rebellion and
violence against the established order and the will of God? What
justification allowed able-bodied men to go begging, contrary to the
natural law of labor? People were afraid. . . of the beggar’s
idleness, his rootlessness, and his anonymity. They no longer knew
with whom they were dealing.
The number of itinerant paupers increased greatly with rampant
inflation in the 16th century, leading many municipalities to outlaw
begging and almsgiving (Geremek 1994: 133—34, 146—47, 211). By
this time the notion of poverty as a morally and spiritually superior
state had long since been abandoned. The deserving poor (the aged,
infirm, orphans, widows with young children) were distinguished from
the undeserving poor (able-bodied paupers). While there was willing-
ness to assist those in the former category, the undeserving poor were
despised for idleness and moral debauchery, and they were subject
to flogging and even death for infractions of the laws and decrees
designed to restrict their wandering and force them to work (Waxman
1977: 95).
A second ingredient in the redefinition of poverty was the humanis-
tic philosophy of the Renaissance. The image of the humble pauper
had splendidly exemplified the medieval ideal of pious acquiescence
in one’s God-given lot in life, whatever it might be. It was totally at
odds with the new humanistic emphasis on individual effort and
aspiration, self-reliance and self-realization. From the perspective of
those ideals, the able-bodied poor came to be viewed as incompetent,
ludicrous, and dangerous human failuresdeserving neither self-respect
nor the respect of others (Waxman 1977: 256).
A third ingredient, related to humanism, was the development of
capitalism and the liberal political philosophy of the 17th and 18th
centuries, The relation between the individual and society changed
from an organic community in which groups were more important
than individuals to a collection of independent, atomized individuals
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all pursuing their private interests and ordering their relations with
each other by means of formal, explicit contracts (Kamenka and Tay
1975: 136—38). While an honored place had been reserved for paupers
in the organic community of the early MiddleAges, theywere useless,
shameless drones in the context of the new values of individualism
and self-reliance.
The fourth and final component in the transformation of poverty
to be considered here is the notion that natural law decrees that the
fit will survive and the unfit perish. An important corollary to this is
that while the operation of this law may seem harsh, in the long run
it works to the benefit of species and societies, and we interfere with
it at our peril. This idea is of course most commonly associated with
Darwin, and its application to social situations typically goes under
the name of social Darwinism, but it actually emerged at least three-
quarters of a century before The Origin of Species (Townsend 1971:
40—41; Malthus 1992: 14—15, 215—16, 227—30). From this point of
view paupers belong to the category of the unfit and it might be
better, as Ebenezer Scrooge said (in a work also written before Dar-
win’s magnum opus), for them to die and decrease the surplus
population.
With these four developments, the condition ofpoverty was utterly
transformed from its representation in the Middle Ages as ideal piety
and moral superiority. While there had been an intelligible—even
honored—place for paupers in the organic, group-centered, medieval
view of the relation between the person and society, poverty no longer
made sense in the context of the newly ascendant humanistic and
individualistic values, The unemployed, unambitious, dependent pau-
per was now seen as a contemptible anomaly. Poverty became a cancer
on society, a cesspool of indolent misfits draining the resources of
honest people who were willing to support themselves. Moreover,
entirely in keeping with the individualistic ideology, responsibility for
the bane of poverty was placed squarely on the poor themselves (Gans
1968: 202, Waxman 1977: 82—84).
State Welfare
The systemic view ofpoverty experienced the beginnings of a resur-
rection in the latter 19th century. The hallmark of this vision is the
subordination of individual rights and interests to public policy and
the public good, as these are articulated, planned, and administeredby
centralized, bureaucratic agencies (Kamenka and Tay 1975: 138—39).
Briefly stated, this is the world of big organizations, big government,
big bureaucracy, and thick volumes of administrative rules and
procedures.
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With this transformation comes the assumption that social problems
have systemic, societal causes and solutions. Elements of state welfare
thinking are clearly visible in thinkers of the latter 18th andearly 19th
centuries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Henri de Saint-Simon,
but the first theorist to develop a systematic account of poverty from
this perspective was Karl Marx. He proposed, as abasic characteristic
of capitalism, that with the accumulation of wealth, the demand for
labor also increases, but in a constantly diminishing proportion (Marx
1967: 629). Capital grows, that is to say, faster than the demand for
labor. This inevitably produces unemployment, and those who are
chronically unemployed are the paupers, “the dead weight of the
industrial reserve army” (p. 644). The responsibility for poverty is
thus to be found in the nature of the economic system, not inpersonal
failings of poor people.
While medieval piety and state welfare share the notion that the
cause of poverty does not rest with paupers as individuals, they are
divided by several crucial differences. Most important, the theological
basis of medieval piety gives way in state welfare to secularism, and
assumptions about a rigidly hierarchical society are replaced with
egalitarian ideals. Moreover, while in medieval thought poverty was
an ideal condition, state welfare theory shares the rugged individualist
notion that it is a problem to be solved—although by very different
means.
An important component of the state welfare mode ofthinking was
the growth, since the late 19th century, of sociology and anthropology,
for it is the stock-in-trade of these disciplines to analyze events more
in terms of social systems and institutions than individual considera-
tions. Of special relevance here is the “culture ofpoverty,” introduced
by anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1959). This is the idea that poverty
is a whole way of life, marked not just by economic destitution but
also by the absence of a prolonged and protected childhood, early
initiation to sex, a low rate of formal marriage, frequent abandonment
of wives and children, maternal dominance, and strong psychological
feelings of marginality, dependence, and inferiority. The culture of
poverty is resistant to change, because “by the time slum children
are age six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values and
attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to
take fulladvantage ofthe changing conditions or increased opportuni-
ties that may occur in their lifetime” (Lewis 1968: 188).
This idea has important implications for the distinction between
the deserving and undeserving poor. From the individualist perspec-
tive able-bodied paupers are to blame for their poverty and are unde-
serving of public assistance. But if, as Lewis claims, the culture of
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poverty reproduces itself in individuals by the age of six or seven,
then it is unjust to hold them personally responsible for their inability
to extricate themselves from their condition. While they may be able-
bodied they are not “able-minded” or “able-cultured,” and the ranks
of the deserving poor should be expanded to include them.
Lewis worked largely in Third World societies, but in the widely
read book The Other America, Michael Harrington (1962) applied
the notion of the culture of poverty to poor people in the United
States. He succeeded in sensitizing many Americans to the plight of
those living among us who, through circumstances beyond their con-
trol, are condemned to lives of want and misery. Another influential
work in the state welfare paradigm was The Negro Family: The Case
forNational Action. This confidential government reportwas prepared
by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1967), then assistant secretary in the
Office of Policy Planning and Research at the Department of Labor,
and submitted to President Lyndon B. Johnson in March 1965. It
contended that the cycle of black poverty would not be broken so
long as the pathological pattern of illegitimacy, divorce and desertion,
and female-headed families remained in force. This report had a
major impact on public policy, for the president relied on it in his
commencement speechon blackpoverty, deliveredat Floward Univer-
sity in 1965 (Katz 1989: 24).
These developments produced a sea change in thinking about pov-
erty in the United States. According to Charles Murray (1984: 29),
“What emerged in the mid-1960s was an almost unbroken intellectual
consensus that the individualist explanation of poverty was altogether
outmoded and reactionary. Poverty was not a consequence of indo-
lence or vice. . .. It was produced by conditions that had nothing to
do with individual virtue or effort. Poverty was not the fault of the
individual but of the system.”
Many thinkers working within the state welfare paradigm—e.g.,
Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Charles Valentine, William Julius
Wilson, and Michael Katz—deny that there is such a thing as a
distinctive culture of poverty. The cause of poverty is an institutional
structure that denies equal opportunity to the lower classes, often
exacerbated by racial discrimination (Duncan 1968: 102—103, Fried
1968: 147—50, Themstrom 1968: 176—79). From this perspective, the
solution to poverty is to provide more opportunities for the poor, such
as training, good jobs, or, simply, money. They can then be relied
upon to exercise their own values (which are not that different from
everyone else’s) to take advantage of these opportunities and improve
their situation. The extreme expression of this point of view came
from a Johnson administration official, whom Marvin Olasky (1992:
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174) quotes as saying: “The way to eliminate poverty is to give the
poor people enough money so that they won’t be poor anymore.”
Despite disagreements over matters such as the culture ofpoverty,
state welfare thinkers are unanimous that poverty is not the fault of
poor people. This view enabled poverty to regain a kind ofrespectabil-
ity that it had lost under rugged individualism. The poor did not, of
course, attain the integral and honorable position they had held in
medieval piety, for the state welfare goal is not to acquiesce to poverty
but to eradicate it. Still, to be poor became less humiliating. Poverty
did not result from some individual aberrancy or failure, but from a
flawed system. As victims of the system, poor people deserved not
contempt but a helping hand.
And because the problem lay in the system, the solution to it must
be to fix the system. That is a tall order. The only agency capable of
designing and enforcing change in something so huge and sprawling
as the overall socioeconomic system is government. Hence the central-
ized planning and administration, and the elevation of public policy
over personal interests, that characterize state welfare thinking. This
point of view dominated, of course, in communist countries, but it
also prevailed in the social democracies of Western Europe. In the
United States it informed the establishment of Social Security and
the federal welfare system in the 1930s and, three decades later, it
was represented in civil rights legislation, affirmative action, and the
War on Poverty.
Contemporary Individualism
But, as was conceded at the outset, the War on Poverty was lost.
The state welfare programs and policies did not work, and they came
under fierce criticism. The worm has turned again and, in the last
decade or so, a different version of poverty has emerged.
A common theme among authors who criticize the state welfare
approach to poverty is that the Great Society programs designed to
help the poor were not only ineffective but, in fact, have made the
situation worse (Banfield 1974: ix, Mead 1986: 65, Murray 1984:
155—62, 218). Charles Murray develops the argument via the econo-
mists’ model of decision-making by rational agents. Poor people, he
posits, use the same calculus of self-interest that everyone else does.
The problem is that, in their precarious circumstances, it is rational
to orient toward short-term rather than long-term gains. Great Society
programs designed as solutions to poverty actually create dependency
on welfare because getting a job and trying to become self-sufficient
produce no short-term advantage over relying on public assistance.
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Hence, the rational choice is to stay on welfare and avoid the drudgery
ofwork (Murray 1984: 155—63).
The attitudes toward poverty fostered by the state welfare way of
thinking also had detrimental effects. As we have seen, from that
perspective poor people are not responsible for their poverty. Many
of them learned that lesson so well that they “tended to view them-
selves as barred from work by lack of training, child care, transporta-
tion, and so on. They thought ofovercoming these obstacles as govern-
ment’s obligation rather than their own. They could hardly imagine
going to work without a government guarantee or protection of some
sort” (Mead 1986: 65). Simultaneously, poverty began to shed its
stigma. Prior to the 1960s it was humiliating to accept the dole, leading
about half of those eligible for welfare to refuse it. The Great Society
brought with it the contrary notion that the humiliation lay in doing
low-paid work, and that one could maintain one’s dignity by going on
welfare (Olasky 1992: 168—69, Sandel 1996: 68).
Murray’s proposal is to do away with virtually the entire federal
welfare system. He would maintain a national unemployment insur-
ance systemto tide over those who have lost their jobs for a reasonably
short period while they find another, and he would rely on private
charities and municipal agencies to take care of the truly deserving
poor who are incapable of work and have no family to support them
(1984: 227—33). As for the able-bodied poor, Murray is unmoved by
the argument that they deserve support because they fell into poverty
due to circumstances beyond their control. In a passage that betrays
an interestingly staccato concept of human experience, he writes:
“people—all people, black or white, rich or poor—may be unequally
responsible for what has happened to them in the past, but all are
equally responsible for what they do next” (p. 234).
Murray seems unforgiving when compared with thinkers in the
state welfare paradigm, but relative to other critics of the welfare
approach his views are benign. With a collaborator, he has recently
enunciated a vision of an organic society where everyone has a place,
and all work—no matter how menial or poorly compensated—is digni-
fied and confers an honorable place in society (Herrnstein and Murray
1994: 527—52). Other authors, such as Lawrence Mead and Edward
Banfield, are more austere. Mead takes the stance of a hard realist.
Abandoning any notion that all work is dignified, his remarkably
Hobbesian account rejects the prospect that people will voluntarily
take the dirtiest and lowest-paid jobs out of a motivation to support
themselves and get ahead. We need policies to force them to work
(Mead 1986: 13).
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Banfield tips his hand in the very first words of the Preface to The
Unheavenly City (Banfield 1968: vii): “This book will probably strike
manyreaders as the work of an ill-tempered and mean-spirited fellow.”
He hastens to assure us that he is really well-meaning and even soft-
hearted, but that his work emerges from a staunch refusal to shyaway
from “the facts.” As he sees them, the facts are grim indeed. There
is no possibility to organize lower-class people to work for their own
improvement because “the lower-class person (as defined here)’ is
incapable ofbeing organized” (p. 130). Lower-class people don’t mind
the squalor of slum living; actually they like it. Nor is the lower-class
person disturbed by the absence of libraries, parks, good schools.
“Indeed, where such things existhe destroys them by acts ofvandalism
if he can” (p. 62).
The outlook isnot hopeful. Banfield (1968: 258) sees little possibility
of the lower class being absorbed into the dominant culture. So dedi-
cated is he to the proposition that programs to alleviate poverty do
more harm than good that he views it as a “frightening fact” that
middle and upper class people want to donate their time and allocate
money in an effort to solve the problem (pp. 253—54). The measures
that Banfield is willing to countenance are made of sterner stuff:
removing lower-class children from their parents either temporarily
or permanently (pp. 229—37), and placing young lower-class males
who havenol: (yet) broken any law under varying levels of surveillance,
parole, or incarceration according to the probability that they will
commit future crimes (pp. 182—84). Although written over a quarter
century ago, The Unheavenly City continues to appeal toconservatives.
As Robert J. Samuelson(1997:49) writes: “TheBanfield theory ignited
outrage, because it meant that, beyond some point, the effort to end
poverty would fail. In the prevailing climate—all problems were then
deemed solvable—this was heresy. But it has stood the test of time
and taps into popular ambivalence about social welfare.”
Poverty Loses Its Meaning
Differences between contemporary individualism and its rugged
precursor are less readilyapparent than those between medieval piety
Banfleld’s definition of the lower class ‘las nothing to do with wealth. The exclusive
defining feature is that a lower class person “is incapable of conceptualizing the future or
of controlling liii impulses and is therefore obliged to live fro,o ,nonent to moment”
(Banfleld 1968: 48). Thus, if you find someone whom you thought was lower class hut who
proves capable of organizing his or her efforts and activities for future benefits, the proper
move in Banfield’s logic is to say that person was not lower class after all, or is 4° longer.
This presesves his view of the lower class as incapable of self-iinprovenient, hut at the cost
of smuggling a good deal of tautolo~’into the argument.
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and state welfare. Indeed, many recent accounts of the nature of
poverty and what should be done about it initially seem indistinguish-
able from rugged individualism at its apogee in the 18th and early
19th centuries. The able-bodied poor are once again blamed for their
condition; they are viewed as pitiful, even contemptible anomalies
who lack the will and perseverance to sustain themselves, The concept
of human nature has returned to the view of people as lao.’ and
corrupt, willing to turn to productive labor only if circumstances
require of it of them. Charles Murray’s diagnosis that public welfare
breeds dependence and should be abolished recapitulates with
remarkable fidelity the proposals advanced in 1803 by Thomas Robert
Malthus in his celebrated Essay on the Principle of Population (Mal-
thus 1992: 228, 263—64, 266, 328; see also Malthus 1986: 9—10). Hard-
line views from Mead and Banfield about keeping the lower class in
its place and forcing them to do menial tasks resonate with lath-
centuiy opinions inBernard Mandeville’s The Fable ofthe Bees (Man-
deville 1970: 294—95) and Joseph Townsend’s A Dissertation on the
Poor Laws (Townsend 1971: 35—36). Marvin Olasky makes such recidi-
vist ideas explicit (Olasky 1992). He adopts an overtly Christian view
of the corruptibility of human nature and recommends that policy
toward poverty stress the tough love of uncompromisingly requiring
work and moral improvement from the poor, just as our ancestors
did from one to three centuries ago.
All these similarities tempt one to think that, state welfare having
exhausted itself, thinking and policy about poverty are returning to
rugged individualism. However, an anecdote from Olasky himself
belies this conclusion and encourages deeper probing into what turn
out to be quite fundamental differences between the rugged and
contemporary varieties of individualism.
As part of his research on the condition of poverty, Olasky stopped
shaving for a few days, dressed in ragged clothing, and joined the
throng of the homeless in some of Washington’s soup kitchens. In
one of them, he asked a volunteer server for a Bible. It was necessary
to pose the question twice before the person understood what was
being requested, and then the answer came that no Bibles were
available. That he raised the question is evidence that Olasky himself
conceptualizes poverty in terms of the rugged individualist model;
that he received the answer he did is evidence that, today, poverty
for much of the rest of society has becQme something quite different.
In the 19th century, the Protestant ethic decreed that Christian
living entailed sobriety, responsibility,and self-sufficiency. Those sunk
in poverty were degraded spiritually as well as economically, and an
important motivation for rescuing people from poverty was to save
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their souls. This attitude may still be found in the Salvation Army and
store-front missions, but by and large, as Olasky’s vain attempt to
acquire a Bible demonstrates, the spiritual significance ofpoverty has
disappeared.
Several other meanings associated with the rugged individualist
view o.1 poverty are also absent from the contemporary version. One
of them is the Social Darwinist idea that nature’s way of maintaining
the health and well-being of a population or species is to weed out
the least fit individuals. This notion was explicitly applied to the poor
by Townsend, who argued in 1786 that whenever a population faces
scarce resources, the weakest members will suffer and, if the situation
is serious enough, die, This is the order of nature. Any interference
with it, such as relief for the poor, will only “increase the number of
unprofitable citizens, and sow the seeds of misery for the whole
community; increasing the general distress, and causing more to die
for want, than if poverty had been left to find its proper channel”
(Townsend 1971: 40—1). Today this sort of explanation continues
to dominate the presentation of other species on television nature
programs, but it would cause instant outrage if it were advanced with
reference to human poverty.
From the rugged individualist perspective poverty also provided
insights into human nature, human civilization, and its progress. Mal-
thus held that the two dominant human drives are for material comforts
and sex. The latter causes population to increase faster than food
production. Within limits this discrepancy is actually beneficial, for if
food were easily obtainable man’s natural indolence would deter him
from hard work. But a population massively outstripping its food
supply would suffer severe want and strife. Hence, it is necessary to
control population growth. This is achieved by constraints on the sex
drive; specifically, by delaying marriage and children until one is
financially able to support a family. By encouraging industriousness,
production, and the exercise of reason over base passion, these condi-
tions stimulate economic and social progress and build individual
character (Malthus 1992: 209—16; see also Montague 1886: 61).
Malthus continued that the poor do not understand these things.
Placing no rein on their passions, they marry early and have many
children. Thus, they unwittingly plunge themselves into destitution,
and they fail to develop the finer qualities of character that come
from self-control (Malthus 1992: 227). Hence, while Malthus favored
abolition of welfare, he wanted to do this gradually and only after his
primary proposal for solving the problem of poverty had been put
into effect, which was to educate the poor. Once they realized that
the cause of their poverty was their own profligate reproduction, most
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of them would mend their ways. This would have the multiple salutary
effects of enabling present paupers to escape their poverty, preventing
young people from falling into it, and turning them all into more
productive citizens and more civilized human beings as they bring
their animal drives under rational control (pp. 274—77, 328).
The larger significance of poverty is diminished in contemporary
individualism. To be sure, the notion that destitute dependence erodes
the character while responsible self-sufficiency bolsters it remains. It
manifests itself in annoyance and impatience with people who cannot
get and hold a job, who as unmarried teenagers place no restraint on
their sexuality and take no responsibilityfor the children theyproduce.
However, these sentiments are targeted at the poor as individuals and
the link with the rise of civilization has largely vanished. Rugged
individualism’s virtue of controlling impulses and faith in social prog-
ress have both been devalued of late. Departing with them are the
notions that what raises us above a brutish existence is voluntary,
rational government of our natural instincts, and that precisely that
self-control spurs the upward growth of civilization.
The difference emerges from a closer comparison of Murray’s pres-
ent proposal to end public welfarewith the ideas proposed by Malthus
nearly two centuries ago. Maithus’ convictions about the value of
controlling base passions and social progress are embedded primarily
in his desire to educate the poor, and this part of his program Murray
does not recapitulate. Indeed, where Malthus believed that the poor
could escape theirpovei’tyiftheywere educated, Murray joins Richard
Herrnstein in the very different view that limited innate intelligence
restricts the degree to which the lower class can be educated (Herr-
nstein and Murray 1994). Jn this sense, contemporary individualism
is leaner and meaner than rugged individualism for it sees fewer
prospects for the poor to improve their state. And since better educa-
tion is not likely to benefit the poor, given their limited intellectual
capacity, the rest of society is justified in declining to allocate the
resources to provide it for them.
The meanings associated with contemporary poverty are much
reduced in comparison not only with rugged individualism but with
medieval pietyand state welfare as well. Medieval poverty represented
much that was honored at the time: a Christ-like existence, pious
renunciation ofworldly things, humble acquiescence in what God had
ordained, and an opportunity to seek divine favor through alms-giving.
In the state welfare paradigm, poverty represented a challenge to the
just and humane society that people were trying to build. The prospect
of eradicating it symbolized what could be achieved in a Marxian
utopia or a Johnsonian Great Society if only sufficient national will,
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expert planning and management, and community resources were
devoted to the task.
The poverty of contemporary individualism has no meaning compa-
rable to these. In its depressing selfpoverty denotes want, stagnation,
and hopelessness. Its larger connotations are even more sordid: drug
addiction, violence, and crime. Of course the non-poor would like to
see all of these things come to an end. But that is no longer anything
more than an end in itself. It is not linked to some shining image or
transcendent crusade such as advancing civilization, saving souls, or
creating a truly equal and just society. The motivation to commitment
and self-sacrifice in the cause of ending poverty has gone slack, with
the upshot that sufficient numbers of the non-poor no longer devote
themselves to the task. Past failures seed their doubt that poverty can
be eradicated, and present values do not provide them with any great
incentive for continuing to try.
Discontinuity and Paralysis
If the contemporary view of poverty is distinguished from all three
ofits predecessors by the lack of a larger meaning, the critical question
is why. My suggestion is that current notions about the nature of
poverty foreclose all possibilities of doing something constructive
about it. This contrasts sharply with the earlier conceptualizations of
poverty, each of which included appropriate courses of action for
dealing with it. This is not to say that what was to be done was in
any sense easy. Supreme human effort was frequently required to
respond properly to poverty, and there was no guarantee of success.
Itwas precisely this challenge that sparked the aspirations and engage-
ment with poverty of those who were determined to make singularly
positive contributions with their lives. In the medieval view poverty
was part of the order God had ordained for the world, and the proper
human response was to acquiesce in it with humility. It cannot have
been easy for the rich and powerful to demean themselves so far as
to honor and serve the poor, and it was more difficult still voluntarily
to renounce the world and its material rewards for the miserable life
of a pauper. Yet these were powerful signs of Christian piety and
devotion, and many strove mightily to embody them so that they
might approximatein their own lives the highestvalues of their culture.
In the view of rugged individualism the cause of poverty was a
natural order of society that had no tolerance for human ignorance
and indolence. This too provided an opportunity and a challenge for
activists who would work for the betterment of humanity. For Malthus
it was to extend the benefits of civilization and education to the poor,
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and thus contribute to human progress. It is even possible that the
temper of the time found a severe nobility in the flinty recommenda-
tions of Malthus and clergyman Joseph Townsend that the poor who
had disdained the opportunity for self-improvement should be left
(together with their innocent children) to die. This policy, they
claimed, was inspired not by lackof compassion but by the conviction
that to assist unregenerate paupers would transgress nature’s (and
God’s) law and inevitably result in greater human suffering in the
long run.
The state welfare paradigm also entailed a clear course of action
for dealing with poverty. Since poverty is caused by a deeply flawed
socioeconomic system, the solution is to reform the system. Again,
while obvious, this is by no means easy. It asks those in privileged
positions to forfeit much of their fortune for the sake of a more
equitable distribution ofwealth, it requires massive effort and expendi-
tures by society at large to provide equal opportunity for all, it might
even demand the sacrifice of partisans’ lives in a violent Marxist
revolution.
While each of the three earlier versions of poverty identified a
meaningful, appropriate, and challenging response to poverty on the
part of the non-poor, this is no longer the case. Today we agree that
poverty is of human origin, stemming either from inequities in the
socioeconomic system (forthose who continue tohold the state welfare
perspective) or from the shortcomings of poor people (for those of a
contemporary individualist persuasion). But in either case, we have
lost the conviction that, collectively, we can do much about it. Not
because the obstacles seem more difficult tosurmount than inprevious
epochs; I have argued, in fact, that the verydifficulty of taking appro-
priate action regarding poverty was an important factor challenging
people of those periods to devote themselves whole-heartedly to the
task. The present situation differs from the other three in that, today,
no appropriate course of action relative to poverty is readily apparent.
The reason for this, I suggest, is that contemporary culture has
generated an unprecedented inconsistency. We think, on the one
hand, that social reality is a human construct, but, at the same time,
we doubt that human beings can exercise any significant control over it.
The first part of this proposition can be stated in weakerand stronger
forms. Most people would assent to the weaker formulation, which
is that the origins of our social institutions (capitalism, democracy,
marriage, etc.) are to be found in human history rather than, say,
divine ordination or natural law. The stronger version is more contro-
versial, with a distinctly postmodernist ring. It is that we actively
create our physical and mental habitats, forming them of artifice and
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simulation, and that these are just as “real” as anything else. As Ada
Louise Huxtable (1997: 1) put it, “I do not Imow just when we lost
our sense of reality or our interest in it, but at some point it was
decided that reality was notthe only option. Itwas possible, permissible
and even desirable to improve on it: one could substitute a more
agreeable product.” FIer specific reference is to architecture, but the
same process has been recentlyobserved in the formation of computer-
generatedvirtual realitiesand online communities,political ideologies,
the representation of the historical past and cultural traditions, and
in countless other sectors of social life. Although the argument being
developed here gains force with the stronger version of the human
construction of social reality, it also can be run with the weaker, more
generally accepted version.
The second part of the proposition—that humans lack significant
control over our humanly constructed reality—is somewhat more
esoteric. I will try to establish it first in the context of social theory,
and then in the arena of practical life and popular thought. According
toSteven Best and Douglas Kellner, one of the most important devel-
opments as social theory moved from structuralism through poststruc-
turalismto postmoderuism is the decline of humanism. Human beings,
that is to say, have relinquished center stage. History and society are
no longer seen as processes that move (or can be moved) in the
direction of actualizing human potential and freedom, as was the
case with Renaissance and Enlightenment thinking. Moreover, human
beings are no longer seen as agents with the ability to influence the
structure of society and the course of history (Best and Kellner 1991:
19—20, 24). One example of this shift is the debate between Louis
Aithusser and John Lewis over the driving force in the Marxian view
ofthe historicaldialectic. For Lewis, representing the earlier, Enlight-
enment tradition (one could also call it modernity), it is human striving
to overcome bondage and alienation and achieve freedom, justice,
and equality. Althusser, taking a poststructuralist perspective, insists
that the engine of history is the class struggle perceived as a force in
itselfand quite apart from any human intentions or aspirations (Aithus-
ser 1976: 46--54).
Perhaps the most influential social theorist espousing a nonhumanist
perspective on history and society is Michel Foucault. In Disciplinc
and Punish (Foucault 1979), he argued that the evolution of “technol-
ogies ofpower” over the last three or four centuries should be under-
stood not in terms of any human plan or intentions, but as the increas-
ing self-actualization and perfection of Power understood as a thing
in itself. Indeed, for Foucault the human subject is neither “transcen-
dental in relation to the field of events’ nor “runs in its empty sameness
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throughout the course of history” (Foucault 1984: 59), but is itself a
product of a certain historical era. Moreover that era may be ending,
and if that should happen “man” too may come to an end, erased
‘<like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1970:
387). The reference here is not to “man” as a representative of a
certain biological species, but rather to “man” as a social being, with
certain attributes such as free will, individual identity, dignity, intelli-
gence, political rights and duties, and so on. The nonhumanism of
this position is explicit: the human individual is a construct of a
certain sociocultural configuration, a particular historical moment. It
is vulnerable to change or even extinction when that moment passes,
rather than transcending and even guiding history.
The nonhumanism ofFoucault and other contemporary social theo-
rists has had a major impact on intellectuals. Their ideas may not
have directly influenced society at large, but they may have filtered
through in other guises. Be that as it may, parallel developments are
discernable in the public sphere. Especially important is the 1994
election. This repudiation of the assumptions that underlay the New
Deal and the Great Society was simultaneously a denial of the general
proposition that, working together to make and implement policy,
human beings can bring about intendedeffects to solve social problems
and improve social conditions. Any such effort, so the thinking goes,
is as likely to make the problem worse as it is to ameliorate it. Here
public opinion concurs with Foucault and other nonhumanist theorists
that human beings are not in control of their own affairs and that
their corporate, intentional efforts to influence them are not likely to
be effective.1
A similar message can be read in Robert Putnam’s recent writings
(1995, 1996) about diminishing social capital and civic engagement
inAmerican society. Putnam uses these concepts to refer to a general
decline in social networks, trusting relationships, cooperation, and
general connection of individuals with their communities. He notes
that in the last 30 years participation by Americans in civic clubs and
organizations has fallen by about 50 percent, and informal interaction
with others through visiting and socializing has dropped by about 25
percent. While I think his identification of television as the culprit is
oversimplified, his statistics documenting the decline of volunteerism
‘One difference ‘nay he that public opinion is likely to hold that while concerted high-
level efforts to effect change are ineffectual, individuals working privately or in s’nall groups
can influence issues in their private lives and localities. Nonliumanist tbourists would
probably recommend another turn of the screw, arguing that what motivates people in
these ,natters are institutional and historical forces with trajectories of their own.
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and social engagement do represent compelling evidence for the
proposition, paralleling that advanced above for the 1994 election,
that many people in our society are losing faith in the possibility of
concerted action to ease social ills or improve the quality of collective
life. Hence, they turn inward—immersing themselves in their private
lives and shunning the larger, public arena.
One of the darker sides of this development is the fact that a
majorityof states now have laws authorizing qualified citizens to carry
concealedweapons. This reflects widespread loss of confidence in the
ability of people in our society to live peaceably together and in the
capacity of law enforcement agencies to protect citizens. Again the
upshot is people turning away from public confidence and public
institutions to a purely personal, private solution: I will arm myself
because, ultimately, I can rely only on myself to protect myself and
my family against the violent elements in society.
We are suspended in the disjuncture between the ideas that social
reality is a human creation and that human beings, acting collectively,
cannot control what happens in that reality. This impasse accounts
for much in our current condition, including why poverty has lost its
meaning. Poverty is clearly something of our own doing, but the non-
poor are no longer moved to take concerted action to alleviate it. This
is not because they think the solution is too difficult or expensive, but
because they have lost confidence that any large-scale plan will work.
They may, of course, lend assistance on a personal level, doing good
in minute particulars. But the notion that this can be part of a program
with more cosmic meaning, a program that promises to eradicate
poverty for onceand for all, founders on the apprehension that humans
exercise very little control over the course of development of the
social reality they themselves have created.
Not everyone, of course, is willing to live with this uncomfortable
and paralyzing combination of ideas. Religious faithful who seek to
tailor themselves to a God-given reality persist, as do social reformers
who seek to tailor reality to a utopian vision. But if the growing
indifference to poverty is any guide, it points to the conclusion that
these groups no longer represent majority opinion or sway public
policy. Those among the non-poor who are unmotivated to grapple
with a problem for which they can disceru no solution find it more
bearable simply not to think about it. This choice includes ordering
where they live, where their children go to school, what they read,
and what they expose themselves to in such a way that poor people
intrude minimally upon their lives and consciousness.
Actually, this strategy does entail a solution of sorts to the problem
ofpoverty, and a remarkably clean and cheap solution at that: to make
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poverty disappear by the simple expedient of not acknowledging it.
This is an especially compelling option if one adopts the stronger
version of the proposition that social reality is a human construct.
That view, it will be recalled, holds that social reality is the product
of artifice and simulation. Things are as we say they are, a “virtual
reality” extending well beyond our computer screens to encompass
our entire social lives. As poverty theorist Michael Katz (1989: 7—8)
has clearly recognized, poverty is not so much the existence of poor
people as the prevailing discourse about them. It follows that if the
prevailing discourse about poverty ceases, if people will just stop
worrying and thinking and talking about it, then poverty itself will
come to an end. Poor people, of course, will continue to exist. But
they will no longer represent a social problem, just as leprosy ceased
to be a social problem although lepers continued to exist.
If one chooses to take a less radical stance and insist that poverty
has a reality of its own apart from what people may think about
it, the outcome is not fundamentally different. Even if becoming
indifferent to poverty does not alter its basic reality, it obviously does
alter what is done (or, more to the point, not done) about it. American
citizens of Japanese descent really were interned in concentration
camps during World War II but little was done about the outrage
until public attention focused on the issue decades later. In the same
way, poverty may be a grim reality, but the loss of a larger meaning
for it, and the resulting indifference among an increasing proportion
of the non-poor, is what, more than anything else, enables legislators
to end welfare as we have known it.
Epilogue
In the spring of 1997 President Clinton convened a domestic summit
conference on volunteerism, with the aim of encouraging Americans
to become more deeply involved in voluntary service. The outcome
of that initiative constitutes an empirical test of the thesis of this essay.
As of this writing it is too early to tell, but the somber prediction
stemming from what has been argued here is that the president’s
effort will bear little fruit, at least in the area of volunteerism relative
to poverty. The reason is that larger meanings necessary to stimulate
people to enlist in the struggle against poverty are lacking. If this
prediction is wrong and the president’s initiative does result in signifi-
cant numbers dedicating themselves to alleviate poverty, the thesis
of this essay would be disproved. In that happy event, my expectation
would be that some fresh set of meanings has emerged to motivate
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the new volunteers in the war against poverty. An important research
question then would be to identi5’ just what those meanings are.
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